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However, as has been recognized by numerous
scholars as well as the OECD since the 1990s, sourcebased taxation of active income is increasingly difficult
because of tax competition among countries to attract
foreign direct investment. Also, various techniques have
been developed by MNEs to shift their income from
high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions, either by transfer pricing or by various earnings stripping techniques (such as
thin capitalization and the judicious placing of intangible
assets in tax havens). The result, as the Obama plan notes,
is that in 2003 nearly one-third of the profits of U.S.-based
MNEs were located in Bermuda, the Netherlands, and
Ireland, and that of the top 10 locations of those profits, 7
had effective tax rates of less than 10 percent.

President Barack Obama last week personally introduced a set of proposals to reform U.S. international
taxation that are the most significant advance toward
preserving the income tax on cross-border transactions
since the enactment of the subpart F rules by the
Kennedy administration in 1962. (For prior coverage, see
Doc 2009-10047 or 2009 TNT 84-1.)
In essence, the Obama proposals introduce a 21stcentury version of the vision begun by Thomas Adams in
1918 and continued by Stanley Surrey in 1961: a world in
which source and residence taxation are coordinated so
as to achieve the underlying goals of the international tax
regime. As I have explained at length elsewhere, those
goals are known as the single tax principle (all income
from cross-border transactions should be subject to tax
once, not more and not less) and the benefits principle
(active income should be taxed primarily at source, and
passive income primarily at residence).
The Obama plan does this by addressing the central
problem of implementing corporate and individual income taxation in a world of open economies: Effective
source taxation requires residence taxation, and effective
residence taxation requires source taxation.
I will comment below on the major proposals in the
Obama plan and explain how they form a coherent step
toward achieving the single tax and benefit principles. I
will first address the proposals related to the taxation of
active income earned by corporations, and then the
proposals related to the taxation of passive income
earned by individuals.

In this environment, effective source-based taxation of
MNEs requires a backup in the form of effective
residence-based taxation. Because more than 90 percent
of the parent corporations of MNEs are resident in OECD
member countries, if all the OECD countries abolished
deferral or exemption of the income of controlled foreign
corporations belonging to their MNEs, then tax competition would cease to be a significant problem and
source-based taxation of active income would once again
be possible, just as it was before globalization took off in
the 1980s.

Source Taxation Requires Residence Taxation
The taxation of active income earned by multinational
enterprises is assigned by the consensus underlying the
international tax regime primarily to the source country.
This makes sense both because the source country provides the benefits that enable the income to be earned
(such as infrastructure and education) and because active
income is earned primarily by corporations, and sourcebased corporate taxation is more sensible than residencebased taxation because corporate residence is not very
meaningful.

The Obama proposal on deferral is much more conservative than some commentators envisaged when the
idea was broached in the president’s budget. For example, the Treasury subpart F report from 2000 (written
when Larry Summers was secretary and therefore of
continued relevance today) suggested a total repeal of
deferral with a lower tax rate for foreign-source income,
or making deferral conditional on the effective foreign
tax rate (a so-called low-tax inclusion, the mirror image
of the current high-tax exclusion from subpart F). The
Obama administration presumably concluded that those
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The Obama proposal takes several significant steps in
that direction. First, it curtails the benefit of deferral by
limiting deductions (other than research and experimentation deductions) taken by U.S.-based MNEs on their tax
return that are associated with the earning of income that
is eligible for deferral until the underlying earnings have
been repatriated. It is estimated that this proposal, which
is based on legislation introduced in 2007 by House Ways
and Means Chair Charles B. Rangel, D-N.Y., would raise
$60.1 billion between 2011 and 2019.
Because R&E is excluded because of the positive
externalities it generates, the main deductions affected
are interest and various forms of headquarters expenses
allocated to foreign-source income. In that context, it is
interesting that the Obama proposal is silent as to
whether the worldwide interest allocation enacted in
2004 and scheduled to take effect in 2011 will in fact be
implemented (it was eliminated in Rangel’s legislation).
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1
One concern that needs to be addressed is that if the
proposal focuses only on disregarded entities, the same results
can be achieved by constructing partnerships between CFCs.
Another issue is section 954(c)(6), the CFC-to-CFC payment rule
first enacted in 2006, which can lead to the same result and
should be allowed to expire at the end of 2009 as scheduled.
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in 1998, that the only tax avoided is the German tax. But
double nontaxation violates the single tax principle,
which has been an underlying idea of the U.S. international tax regime since 1918. As Adams stated when
explaining why the United States uses an FTC rather than
an exemption to prevent double taxation, ‘‘the state
which with a fine regard for the rights of the taxpayer
takes pains to relieve double taxation, may fairly take
measures to ensure that the person or property pays at
least one tax.’’
The MNEs would no doubt argue that those steps to
enhance residence-based taxation would adversely affect
their competitiveness. But they have been making the
same argument since 1961 with no regard to the actual
competitive position of U.S.-based MNEs (in 1961, they
dominated the world) and without any evidence that any
of the changes to U.S. international tax rules in the past 48
years have in fact adversely affected them.
A more serious concern is that those parts of the
Obama plan would induce U.S.-based MNEs to migrate
their headquarters to other locations with laxer rules, and
that new businesses that are run from the United States
would be established with foreign parent companies. The
anti-inversion rules enacted in 2004 establish some defense against the first threat but are ineffective against the
second.2 Because of this, I would suggest that Congress
enact the ‘‘managed and controlled’’ provision of the
Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act sponsored by Sen. Carl Levin,
D-Mich., and Rep. Lloyd Doggett, D-Texas, which would
treat as a U.S. resident any corporation that is publicly
traded or has more than $50 million in assets and that is
not a CFC if its actual management is in the United
States. I doubt that too many CEOs of U.S.-based parents
would actually be willing to move to tax havens in
response (as the level of services in the havens is commensurate with the level of taxation).
In the longer term, I would urge the Obama administration to seek to curtail deferral in further cooperation
with the OECD. If all OECD countries acted in unison to
abolish deferral, tax competition could be eliminated
without any threat to the competitiveness of U.S.-based
MNEs. The Obama plan is a helpful first step in that
direction and could be used as a way of persuading other
OECD members to follow suit (as they did, for example,
in prohibiting foreign bribes by their MNEs after the
United States enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
Corporations should be taxed primarily at source, and
one can imagine an ideal world of purely source-based
corporate taxation (if transfer pricing and other forms of
shifting income are taken care of). But in a world of open
economies, source-based corporate taxation must be
backed up by residence-based corporate taxation because
otherwise, tax competition and artificial income shifting
lead to no corporate taxation at all (Intel notoriously pays
not a penny in tax outside the United States, and the
overall effective tax rate of U.S.-based MNEs on foreignsource profits is very low). The corporate provisions of
the Obama plan are an important first step in protecting
the U.S. corporate tax base from erosion, and in helping

2
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types of proposals would run into too much opposition
from the MNEs in the name of competitiveness.
Second, the Obama proposal reins in various forms of
foreign tax credit abuse such as FTC generators (like the
ones used by insurance giant AIG) and transactions that
purport to generate current FTCs while the underlying
income is subject to deferral. While the details are still
unclear, the first proposal would focus on granting FTCs
only for taxes that the taxpayer ‘‘actually pays,’’ which
presumably refers to various techniques that use the
technical taxpayer rule to obtain credits for taxes economically borne by another party to the transaction. The
second proposal relates to schemes built on the Guardian
case (Guardian Industries Corp. v. United States, 477 F.3d
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007), Doc 2007-4863, 2007 TNT 38-14), in
which the taxpayer used a Luxembourg form of consolidation to obtain direct credits for taxes paid by a Luxembourg holding company (which was treated as a branch
for U.S. tax purposes) while maintaining deferral for the
underlying earnings in the operating Luxembourg subsidiary.
The IRS has attacked this type of structure in regulations, but the regulations depend on the use of foreign
consolidation, and the same result can be achieved simply by using a hybrid (U.S. branch, foreign corporation)
as the holding company and a reverse hybrid (U.S.
corporation, foreign branch) as the operating subsidiary.
The two FTC proposals together would raise $43 billion
from 2011 to 2019. Those revenues and the revenues from
curtailing deferral would be used to finally make the
R&E credit permanent (at a cost of $74.5 billion over the
same 10 years).
Third, the Obama proposal revives Notice 98-11, 1998-1
C.B. 433, Doc 98-2983, 98 TNT 12-8, by preventing MNEs
from abusing the check-the-box option to make flows of
passive income between CFCs disappear for subpart F
purposes. As the proposal explains, if a U.S. parent has a
CFC in the Caymans with two second-tier subsidiaries in
Germany and in the Caymans, and the second-tier Caymans sub makes a loan to the German sub, it is possible
to avoid subpart F inclusion of the interest paid from
Germany to the Caymans by making both second-tier
subs appear to be branches of the Caymans holding company. Because one cannot lend money to oneself, the result
is no loan and no interest income, but the interest deduction is still effective to transfer profits from Germany to the
Caymans. It is estimated that this provision would raise
a whopping $86.5 billion from 2011 to 2019 (indicating that
in the administration’s view, MNEs cannot achieve the
same result without relying on check the box, as they
argued successfully in 1997 in support of the check-thebox rule).1
This is essentially the same as Example 2 of Notice
98-11, and the MNEs would no doubt object, as they did
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Residence Taxation Requires Source Taxation
The recent saga involving Swiss bank UBS has shown
that effective residence-based taxation of U.S. individual
citizens and residents is impossible in the absence of
U.S.-source taxation of foreigners. Beginning with the
enactment of the portfolio interest exemption in 1984, the
United States has engaged in a race to the bottom
designed to attract residents of other countries to invest
their funds in the United States without having to report
the income to their home jurisdiction. Thus, we permit
those foreign residents to earn investment income from
U.S. sources without meaningful withholding (capital
gains, interest, and royalties are exempt, and dividends
can be replaced with dividend substitutes) and without
the U.S. payer having any information about the real
identity of the payee (interest can be paid directly to tax
haven corporations, while royalties and dividends can be
paid to qualified intermediaries, and in both cases, the
U.S. withholding agent will not know who the real payee
is).
The problem, as the UBS case revealed, is that these
rules enable U.S. residents to also earn U.S.-source investment income without paying any tax on it. The provisions that are designed to prevent this, such as legends on
bearer certificates and audits of qualified intermediaries
by foreign auditors, do not work.
The Obama plan contains several helpful provisions
designed to prevent U.S. residents from evading U.S.
taxation. The plan constructs a dichotomy between investors through QIs and other investors. In the case of
QIs:
The Administration’s plan would increase the reporting requirement on international investors and
financial institutions, especially QIs. QIs would be
required to report information on their U.S. customers to the same extent that U.S. financial intermediaries must. And U.S. customers at QIs would
no longer be allowed to hide behind foreign entities. U.S. investors would be required to report
transfers of money or property made to or from
non-QI foreign financial institutions on their income tax returns. Financial institutions would face
enhanced information reporting requirements for
transactions that establish a foreign business entity
or transfer assets to and from foreign financial
accounts on behalf of U.S. individuals.
In the case of investors through non-QIs, the Obama
proposals would:
• impose a withholding tax of 20 percent to 30 percent
on U.S.-source payments to individuals who use
non-QIs, refundable on showing that the true recipient is a non-U.S. resident;
• create a rebuttable presumption that any foreign
account held by the U.S. citizen at a non-QI is
subject to foreign bank account reporting; and
• increase penalties and extend the statute of limitations.
Also, the line between QIs and non-QIs would be
enforced by requiring all affiliates of a QI to be QIs. Those
TAX NOTES, May 11, 2009

proposals together would raise only a modest $8.7 billion
over 10 years, a far more conservative estimate than
others have suggested for similar proposals (for example,
the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act).
This solution is similar to the EU savings directive in
that it relies on information exchange (in the case of QIs)
and refundable withholding (in the case of non-QIs). In
principle it should work, but the devil is in the details.
For example, how will the QI rules be effectively enforced in the face of foreign bank secrecy claims such as
those advanced by UBS?
Another issue is that the non-QI rules apply only to
U.S.-source income, but many types of investment income that economically are U.S.-source are treated as
non-U.S.-source under current rules. For example, capital
gains are sourced to the residence of the seller (who will
purport to be a foreign investor), and dividend substitutes under equity swaps are sourced to the residence of
the recipient.3
Still, the Obama plan is definitely a step in the right
direction toward enforcing residence-based taxation on
U.S. citizens and residents. Enacting the Stop Tax Haven
Abuse Act, which has the support of the Obama administration, would be another advance toward the same
goal. Further steps require cooperation by other countries, lest they induce investor flight from the United
States.
The key observation here is that funds cannot remain
in tax havens and be productive; they must be reinvested
into the prosperous and stable economies of the world
(which is why some laundered funds that need to remain
in the tax havens earn a negative interest rate). If the
OECD countries could agree, they could eliminate the tax
havens’ harmful activities overnight by, for example,
imposing a refundable withholding tax (for example, at
35 percent) on all payments to noncooperating tax havens, or more broadly, to all nontreaty countries, and
insisting on effective automatic exchange of information
with treaty countries. The withholding tax would be
refunded on a showing that the income was reported to
the residence country. This idea is similar to, but much
broader than, the refundable withholding tax proposal in
the Obama plan.
The financial services industry would no doubt lobby
hard against such a step on the grounds that it would
induce investors to shift funds to other OECD member
countries. However, the EU and Japan have both committed themselves to taxing their residents on foreignsource interest income. The EU savings directive, in
particular, requires all EU members to cooperate in the
exchange of information or impose a withholding tax on
interest paid to EU residents. Both the EU and Japan
would like to extend this treatment to income from the
United States. Thus, this would seem an appropriate
moment to cooperate with other OECD member countries by imposing a withholding tax on payments to tax

3
This problem can be solved if dividend substitutes are
treated as dividends, as envisioned by the Stop Tax Haven
Abuse Act.
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to level the playing field between U.S.-based MNEs and
purely domestic businesses subject to the full 35 percent
U.S. corporate tax rate.
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havens that cannot be induced to cooperate in exchanging information, without triggering a flow of capital out
of the OECD.
Fundamentally, in a globalized world with open
economies, residence taxation of individuals is impossible without source-based taxation because in the absence of source taxation, the information required to
ensure residence taxation is not available. The Obama
plan recognizes this reality and is a major step toward
achieving taxation of U.S. citizens and residents based on
their true ability to pay.

Conclusion
As the president stated in introducing his plan:
Nobody likes paying taxes, particularly in times of
economic stress. But most Americans meet their
responsibilities because they understand that it’s an
obligation of citizenship, necessary to pay the costs
of our common defense and our mutual well-being.
And yet, even as most American citizens and
businesses meet these responsibilities, there are
others who are shirking theirs. And many are aided
and abetted by a broken tax system, written by
well-connected lobbyists on behalf of well-heeled
interests and individuals. It’s a tax code full of
corporate loopholes that makes it perfectly legal for
companies to avoid paying their fair share. It’s a tax
code that makes it all too easy for a small number of
individuals and companies to abuse overseas tax
havens to avoid paying any taxes at all. And it’s a
tax code that says you should pay lower taxes if
you create a job in Bangalore, India, than if you
create one in Buffalo, New York.
Now, understand, one of the strengths of our
economy is the global reach of our businesses. And
I want to see our companies remain the most
competitive in the world. But the way to make sure
that happens is not to reward our companies for
moving jobs off our shores or transferring profits to
overseas tax havens. This is something that I talked
about again and again during the course of the
campaign. The way we make our businesses competitive is not to reward American companies operating overseas with a roughly 2 percent tax rate
on foreign profits; a rate that costs taxpayers tens of
billions of dollars a year. The way to make American businesses competitive is not to let some citizens and businesses dodge their responsibilities
while ordinary Americans pick up the slack.
The Obama plan for reforming U.S. international tax
rules is incomplete, and it will no doubt be much
amended in Congress. But it represents a crucial first step
that is based on the realization that in our interdependent
world, it is not possible to achieve either source- or
residence-based taxation without the other form being
effectively implemented, and that without taxing crossborder income, all income taxation becomes impossible,
because income taxation requires taxing capital and
capital is mobile across borders. If we want to preserve
the income tax and retain some progressivity in our tax
system, the Obama plan should be enacted as soon as
possible.
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